World leaders gather to address nuclear terrorism, South Asian proliferation

http://thefastertimes.com/india/2010/04/12/nuclear-arms-race-in-south-asia-is-the-us-india-nuclear-pact-really-to-blame/

excerpts:

“The New York Times carries a front-page story today that claims the Obama administration’s nuclear security conference currently taking place in Washington is ignoring a looming nuclear arms race in South Asia. The article says that Pakistan has recently fired up a new nuclear reactor that will be used to process high-grade plutonium for a second generation of nuclear weapons. It says this new weapons-production activity, coming at a time when Pakistan seems increasingly unstable and faces an existential threat from homegrown Islamic extremists such as the Pakistani Taliban, raises the danger that nuclear weapons or material will fall into the hands of terrorists.

…The story also fails to mention that the civil nuclear deal does not guarantee India a supply of uranium in the event it tests another nuclear device (as it did not only in 1974, but in 1998 as well). If that happens, then despite this new nuclear deal, India is likely to face sanctions once again. (Which is why some on both the left and right in India opposed the civil nuclear deal and instead wanted India to try to go it alone on nuclear power; they feel the deal basically gives the U.S. too much leverage over India’s nuclear weapons program, essentially preventing it from testing another device without facing serious economic consequences.) Yes, theoretically, the new reactors which companies from Russia, France, the U.S. and Canada are likely to soon be building in India would free up the older Indian reactors and their fuel for use in the country’s nuclear weapons program. But, given India’s huge power demands, it might just as well need those old reactors to keep feeding the electricity grid too. There is also a fairly limited supply of indigenous uranium in India and any new uranium brought into India, under the terms of a reprocessing agreement that is part of the whole civil nuclear agreement, will not be available for India’s weapons program – so there is probably a limit in how many new warheads India will be able to build simply using its existing fuel stockpiles.

…What the article might have mentioned is that the U.S. could be doing a lot more to persuade India and Pakistan to take measures that might lessen the chance of a nuclear exchange if the two countries do become involved in a conventional military conflict, as they have numerous times in the past. For instance, it would be very useful if they each articulated a clear nuclear defense doctrine. It would also be good if the two nations shared far more information with one another about their nuclear defenses so that signs would not be misinterpreted during a crisis. Getting Islamabad to agree to a “no first use” policy would be a huge step too (although Islamabad would be unlikely to agree to such a measure.)"